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I. CELEBRATING TEN YEARS OF NEW LEGAL REALISM 
This symposium commemorates the tenth year that a body of research has 
formally flown under the banner of New Legal Realism (NLR).1 We are very pleased 
 
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law; American Bar 
Foundation, Director Emeritus. 
** Research Faculty, American Bar Foundation; John and Rylla Bosshard Professor, University of 
Wisconsin Law School. Many thanks are owed to Frances Tung for her help in overseeing part of the 
original Tenth Anniversary NLR conference, as well as in putting together some aspects of this 
Symposium. 
1. The Tenth Anniversary NLR Conference was held in 2014, exactly ten years after the 
inaugural U.S. NLR conference, held in 2004 at the University of Wisconsin Law School with support 
from the American Bar Foundation. Howard Erlanger et al., Forward: Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?, 
2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 335–63 (2005). 
As Stewart Macaulay notes in his article for this new symposium, there have been calls for a new Legal 
Realism for some time. He cites the early example of Lynn M. LoPucki, Bringing Realism to the 
Classroom—A Review of Warren and Westbrook’s The Law of Debtors and Creditors, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 641, 
641 (1987) (describing NLR as “born of the old Realism and nurtured in the law and society 
movement”).  
For other early examples calling for renewed attention to social science on the part of legal scholars see 
also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY (1997) (Tamanaha’s early formulation 
of a “realistic socio-legal theory”); Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of 
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997) (stressing quantitative approaches); 
Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Ethics in the Next Generation: The Push for a New Legal Realism, 23 LAW &  
SOC. INQUIRY 237, 237–39 (1998) (not limiting the kinds of methods to be used). All of these early 
calls for forms of new legal realism shared an emphasis on the integration of empirical social science 
research into legal scholarship. See generally Elizabeth Mertz, Introduction – New Legal Realism: Law and 
Social Science in the New Millenium, in THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, VOL. I: TRANSLATING LAW-AND 
SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S LEGAL PRACTICE 1-25, 4-11(Elizabeth Mertz, Stewart Macaulay &  
Thomas W. Mitchell, eds., 2016); New Legal Realism, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
New_legal_realism (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). As we’ve noted, however, the first formal conference and 
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that the UC Irvine Law Review has elected to publish these articles and memorialize 
the 10th Anniversary NLR Conference that took place in Irvine in August 2014, 
with the support of the American Bar Foundation and the University of California, 
Irvine School of Law (UCI Law).2 The four articles in this symposium and the 
concluding essay make important scholarly contributions and help in different ways 
to continue to define the NLR project while fostering its further development.3 As 
we will suggest in this Introduction, we believe there are good reasons to keep this 
project moving in the direction that these articles chart. We begin with a short 
introduction to the NLR project. 
After ten years and quite a number of publications and scholarly presentations 
on the subject, NLR is gaining increasing acceptance as an important current strand 
of the renewed interest in empirical and social science work on law.4 This growing 
recognition has arguably eclipsed a few earlier arguments over how to delineate (or 
possibly police) who could be legitimate descendants of the original Legal Realism 
of the 1930s in the United States, and over the degree to which any current group 
could claim a Realist legacy.5 Of course, the question of what was legitimately part 
 
ensuing published conference symposia in North America occurred in 2004. See Symposium, New Legal 
Realism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335 (2005); see also Symposium, New Legal Realism, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
795 (2006). 
2. The authors wish to acknowledge the major support of the University of California, Irvine 
School of Law and the American Bar Foundation in funding the 10th Anniversary Conference, as well 
as the University of California, Irvine Law School for its gracious hosting of the event. The law student 
editors of the UC Irvine Law Review were in attendance at the conference, and their group has worked 
conscientiously and seamlessly at the task of coordinating this part of the publication effort from that 
conference, which will also include a Symposium in the peer-reviewed journal Law & Social Inquiry, as 
well as an edited volume focusing specifically on legal education. We appreciate their patient work and 
their vision. 
3. From its inception, many involved in the NLR project have sought to develop its defining 
directions not only through programmatic statements but “in the doing“ of the work. As Christopher 
Tomlins explains, these NLR scholars incorporate “pragmatist perspectives from multiple fields,” with 
the goal of “develop[ing] their new approach in large part through practicing it.” Christopher Tomlins, 
In This Issue, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 795, 795–96 (2006). 
4. Discussions of the current resurgence of interest in social science within law now frequently 
list NLR as one of the major current schools of thought. This appears in arenas largely centered on 
social science as well as those centered on legal scholarship, which is in itself a promising sign. 
See, e.g., the Institute for Advanced Study’s School of Social Science in Princeton announcement of  
its theme for 2016-2017 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.sss.ias.edu/law_and_social_sciences 
[https://perma.cc/N3LR-3FFY] (stating that recent decades have seen “the emergence of 
contemporary critical legal thought, the flourishing of the ‘Law and’ movements, the rise of New Legal 
Realism, Empirical Legal Studies, and Global Legal Pluralism”); the Association of American Law 
Schools’ Section on Law and Interpretation Annual Meeting Program 2016: “The Empirics  
of Legal Interpretation” (Jan. 11, 2016) https://memberaccess.aals.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx? 
webcode=SesDetails&ses_key=4c5fe744-71da-463d-a8b8-6f53f2e9aa3b [https://perma.cc/BX6R-
EFE2] (stating that “[l]egal empiricism—whether under the rubric of empirical legal studies, new legal 
realism, or any number of other ‘brands’ of empirical study—is here to stay”); see also sources cited in 
Section II infra. 
5. While Brian Leiter took a relatively extreme position on this issue, even claiming that the 
early Realists were not really interested in social science, his view has remained a minority position, 
contrasting with the views of major writers on the Realists such as Jack Schlegel, William Twining, Brian 
Tamanaha, and others. See Brian Leiter, Legal Realisms, Old and New, 47 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 949, 
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of even the original Legal Realism is not settled.6 In any event, our concern is not 
with definitional issues or ownership. The New Legal Realists involved in our 
project are concerned with advancing a constructive relationship between law and 
the social sciences—building on, but moving beyond, the earlier Legal Realism, 
which had begun to develop that relationship purposively.7 
NLR is not alone in making renewed calls for more social science research on 
law, for its emergence coincided with similar calls from those in the Empirical Legal 
Studies (ELS) movement and from law professors with roots in law and economics 
and behavioral law and economics, among others.8 In addition, there has a been a 
subtle division even among those calling for a “new legal realism,” with a few of the 
writers in this area effectively limiting the field to large data-set, quantitative 
research.9 However, the broader span of writings claiming the aegis of “new legal 
realism” has cast a wider net, both in terms of methods and disciplines.10 It is our 
view that it is important for New Legal Realists to keep the doors open to multiple 
disciplines and methods, and furthermore to use our tools on ourselves as well. 
From the point of view of a thorough and searching social science analytic lens, the 
 
949–63 (2013). See, e.g., JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN & THE LEGAL REALIST MOVEMENT 
185–96 (2d ed. 2012); TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 8, 44–46, 53. 
6. Among other issues, there is a debate about whether Roscoe Pound should be in or out 
despite the fact that he was explicitly written out by Karl Llewellyn. See N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the 
Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A Prequel to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Legal Realism, 1989 DUKE  
L.J. 1302 (1989). 
See also Tamanaha’s detailed examination of the rather inchoate nature of the original Realist group as 
well as its definition of “realism” in Brian Z. Tamanaha, Legal Realism in Context, in THE NEW LEGAL 
REALISM, VOL. I: TRANSLATING LAW-AND-SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S LEGAL PRACTICE 147–68 (Mertz 
et al., eds., 2016). 
In recent publications dealing with NLR, William Twining, Brian Tamanaha, and Hanoch Dagan have 
separately made a similar argument that it matters more how this generation of Realists carries forward 
our understanding of “law in action” than how our work fits precisely with prior generations of Realist 
scholars. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING 
PRIVATE LAW THEORY (2013); 
William Twining, Legal R/realism and Jurisprudence: Ten Theses, in THE NEW LEGAL REALISM,  
VOL. I: TRANSLATING LAW-AND-SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S LEGAL PRACTICE 121–146 (Mertz et al., 
eds., 2016); Tamanaha, supra. 
7. Symposium, New Legal Realism, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 121 (2016); see also Bryant Garth, 
Introduction: Taking New Legal Realism to Transnational Issues and Institutions, 31 L. & SOC. INQ. 939, 939-
945 (2006); Heinz Klug & Sally Merry, Introduction, THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, VOL. II: STUDYING 
LAW GLOBALLY, 1-9 (Heinz Klug & Sally Merry, eds., 2016). 
8.  Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response 
to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713 (2011); Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV 1471 (1998); Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth 
Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 555 (2010). 
9. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 1; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism,  
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2008). 
10. Often referred to as a “big tent” approach, the more encompassing approach owes much 
to its roots in the Law and Society tradition. See Klug & Merry, supra note 7, at 8; Stewart Macaulay & 
Elizabeth Mertz, New Legal Realism and the Empirical Turn in Law, in LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 195, 
198–202 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2d ed. 2013); Mertz, supra note 1, at 4-11. 
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privileging of quantitative and experimental work by some “empirical legal scholars” 
inside law schools is a socially constructed phenomenon to be explained.11 It is 
certainly not about what kind of social science best accounts for social problems 
and solutions. The law-and-society community, to be sure, already embodies this 
catholic approach to social science methods, but we believe that the key to NLR is 
that it focuses explicitly on translation of social science theories—in addition to the 
methods and findings that address those theories—into mainstream law schools 
and legal scholarship. When attempting to adapt social science in legal settings, it is 
a mistake, in our view, to ignore the special worldview and methods of law as a 
discipline—and law schools as institutions—in their own right. 
II. A DEVELOPING TRADITION 
So how has big-tent NLR developed over the past decade? Looking back to 
its early incarnation in 2003, the movement emphasized the need to provide a broad 
template for incorporating social science and law. In contrast with those who might 
want to limit the empirical resources upon which law draws to single social science 
disciplines and their associated methodologies, these NLR scholars envisioned 
integrating the full range of social science disciplines and methods within their 
project.12 And in contrast with some who might want to limit empirical work within 
law to the study of appellate courts, NLR researchers pushed for a more 
thoroughgoing program of research on law, from everyday experiences of law’s 
effects on the ground on the one hand, through law as it is practiced by attorneys 
at large law firms or negotiated in international fora on the other hand.13 At the 
same time, these scholars also insisted that the discipline of law itself be taken 
seriously—including the “law in books” often (mistakenly) viewed as the polar 
opposite of the “law in action” discussed by realist scholars.14 
 
11. Christine B. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Empirical Legal Training in the U.S. Academy, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 1044, 1045 (Peter Cane & Herbert  
M. Kritzer eds., 2010). 
12. Erlanger et al, supra note 1, at 336, 362–363 (describing NLR research using qualitative, 
quantitative, and experimental methods). 
13. Id. at 346. 
14. Id. at 337 (warning against social science approaches that ignore the “need to translate into 
the language of law”). 
In fact, those who assume that the original Realists ignored “law in books” seriously misunderstand the 
actual views of many Realists regarding the role of doctrine. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, 
BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010) (arguing 
that most realists espoused a “balanced realism” that acknowledged a rule-bound aspect of judging). 
For example, Karl Llewellyn, often identified as a core figure in the original Realist movement, was 
himself also instrumental in the redrafting of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the U.S., which 
is, of course, a quintessential example of “law in books.”  To be sure, Llewellyn and his partner (in 
many ways!) Soia Mentschikoff attempted to bring the UCC closer to the “law in action” by drafting 
provisions that asked judges to look at the actual behaviors of parties to contracts. If they had had no 
faith in “law in books,” it is baffling why they would have devoted so much energy to writing and 
pushing for the enactment of a model law. See generally WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND 
THE REALIST MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1985). 
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The initial publications in this nascent field also stressed a number of other 
key aspects of big-tent NLR, including notably: (1) the use of “bottom-up” 
empirical perspectives and methods in addition to “top-down” in studying law;15 (2) 
the need for conscious attention to the process of interdisciplinary translation;16 (3) 
the importance of analyzing the politics and sociology of our own scholarly worlds, 
given that all scholarship is “situated knowledge”;17 (4) the centrality of globalization 
to understanding law in today’s world;18 (5) the potential in NLR to combine 
critique with “legal optimism” so as to build toward positive policy interventions in 
addition to warning about dangers in current legal arrangements;19 (6) the good “fit” 
between NLR approaches and pragmatist philosophy, especially that derived from 
the work of Dewey;20 and (7) the crucial part that rethinking legal education has to 
play in formulating an NLR agenda that combines theory, empiricism, and practice 
for the next generation of lawyers.21 
As we have noted, the initial NLR efforts came at a time of sharp division over 
methodologies within the group of scholars working to integrate social science into 
U.S. law schools.22 Some social scientists who had been involved in the Law and 
Society Association in the United States had decided to form the separate Society 
for Empirical Legal Studies. Although the leadership of this group eventually 
publicly embraced qualitative research as a valid form of empirical work (albeit not 
a core interest of theirs), a few adherents during its earlier days attempted to cordon 
off the ground of legitimate empirical work on law for quantitative research only.23 
One somewhat subtle indicator of this effort was the practice adopted by some of 
using the word “empirical” itself as a synonym for “quantitative” research—as if 
qualitative data and research were not also clearly “empirical” under any usual 
 
15. The concept of “bottom-up” includes both methods that start from the ground level of law 
as it works in action—in actual social life—and also perspectives on law drawn from the study of non-elite 
members of a social hierarchy, in addition to the “top-down” perspectives of elites (which includes the 
social actors at the top of the hierarchy such as the legal professionals and politicians who formulate 
and carry out law). 
16. Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 341–42. 
17. Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 575, 590 (1988). 
18. Erlanger et al., supra note 1, at 343–44. 
19. Id. at 345. 
20. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (1916); John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 27 
(1924). 
21. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND 
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 174 (1991); Louise G. Trubek, Crossing Boundaries: Legal Education and 
the Challenge of the “New Public Interest Law,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 255 (2005). See generally Erlanger et al., 
supra note 1. 
22. See supra Part I at 3–4. 
23. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law 
Schools, 81 IND. L. J. 141, 141 (2006) (defining empirical legal scholarship narrowly as “a model-based 
approach coupled with a quantitative method”). 
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definition of the term.24 The effects of this division are visible in NLR’s own early 
focus on the importance of a big tent for empirical research on law, avoiding narrow 
definitions that might interfere with accessing the combined benefits of all of the 
social sciences for law professors, lawyers, and judges. 
In the intervening years, this early division has loosened somewhat, leaving 
NLR scholars freer to move beyond debates over whether multiple methods should 
be available to empirical scholarship on law. Instead, now, work can focus on how 
and when to combine particular methods—and even more importantly, on the need 
for empirical research to be guided by theory. Scholars who use quantitative as well 
as qualitative methods have begun to press for more sophisticated engagement with 
the theoretical frames that provide crucial contexts for all social science methods.25  
Just as recent NLR scholarship is casting doubt on the utility of black-and-white 
separations between realist and formalist approaches to law, it is also questioning 
the validity of stark divisions between qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
studying law. Moving beyond these struggles over often inaccurate dichotomies has 
opened up a new space for more sophisticated, theory-informed, multiple-method 
research—and for scholarly understandings of law that benefit from this kind of 
research in formulating better legal analyses and pedagogies. A continuing theme in 
NLR is the idea that it is not necessary for law professors to themselves perform 
empirical research in order for them to become more sophisticated users of that 
research—just as empirical scholars often draw on research other than their own so 
that they can set the findings of individual studies within wider contexts. Another 
model has law professors teaming up with social scientists in research partnerships 
that draw fully on both sets of expertise. Two recent examples of these kinds of co-
authorships (both involving UCI Law faculty) are (1) works by L. Song Richardson 
in partnership with Phillip Atiba Goff from the Psychology and Social Behavior 
Department of University of California, Los Angeles, on implicit racial bias, and (2) 
Benjamin Van Rooij working with Adam Fine from the Psychology Department of 
UCI, on rule orientation and behavior.26 
In the years since the opening NLR conference, there has also been a 
fascinating discussion of how to move an NLR scholarly agenda forward within the 
law schools. Although they are very much in keeping with many of the broad 
directions suggested by the big-tent scholars, these writings have moved our 
thinking into somewhat more specific channels—in ways that at times overlap with 
one another while, predictably, at other times taking somewhat disparate directions. 
Hanoch Dagan, Brian Tamanaha, Greg Shaffer and Victoria Nourse, William 
 
24. “Based on testing or experience.” Empirical, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2008). 
25. See, e.g., AMY R. POTEETE ET AL., WORKING TOGETHER: COLLECTIVE ACTION, THE 
COMMONS, AND MULTIPLE METHODS IN PRACTICE (1968). 
26. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage,  
122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013); Adam Fine, Benjamin Van Rooij et al., Rule Orientation and Behavior:   
Development and Validation of a Scale Measuring Individual Acceptance of Rule Violation, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2846014 (2015). 
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Twining, Elizabeth Mertz, Michael McCann, and Stewart Macaulay have written a 
number of programmatic statements that have much in common but, 
understandably, tend to diverge slightly where they emphasize the virtues of the 
scholarly approaches that draw on their own training and expertise.27 This 
demonstrates how big-tent NLR is creating new spaces for discussion among 
researchers whose expertise crosses boundaries that often prevent any productive 
scholarly conversation. 
As noted, big-tent NLR has from its initial framing insisted that it is important 
to move to more international and global levels in theorizing and empirically 
studying law.28 And as scholars from around the world engage with NLR, they are 
bringing fresh perspectives and creating new links among different national and 
regional perspectives on legal studies. Notably, legal scholars working outside of the 
Anglo-American legal tradition are often even more focused on formal analyses of 
law than are those within that tradition. Within continental Europe and the 
countries influenced deeply by colonial relationships with “Old Europe,” the 
leading figure in the legal academy has long been the grand professor who teaches 
and writes and literally pronounces on the authoritative interpretations of civil and 
criminal codes.29 Legal scholarship that does not embrace legal formalism, and even 
more so that involves empirical research, has been against the grain, but recently 
there are strong efforts to build new traditions favoring interdisciplinary and 
empirical research.30 
Furthermore, even scholars advocating formalism are acknowledging the 
power of an NLR premised on combining “top-down” and “bottom-up” research 
on law, as well as on combining analysis of law in action with serious consideration 
of law in books. One such formalist scholar, Jean D’Aspremont, comments that the 
big-tent NLR scholars “seek to complement quantitative analyses by a use of 
qualitative methods,” leading them to “embrace a new interdisciplinary paradigm 
and create translations between law and social science which they want to be useful 
 
27. See DAGAN, supra note 6; Stewart Macaulay, A New Legal Realism: Elegant Models and the Messy 
Law in Action, in THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, VOL. I: TRANSLATING LAW-AND-SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S 
LEGAL PRACTICE 29–50 (Mertz et al., eds., 2016); Michael McCann, Preface to The New Legal Realism, 
Vol. I & II, in THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, VOL. I: TRANSLATING LAW-AND-SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S 
LEGAL PRACTICE xiii–xxi (Mertz et al., eds., 2016); Elizabeth Mertz, Introduction: New Legal Realism: Law 
and Social Science in the New Millennium, in THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, VOL. I: TRANSLATING LAW-AND-
SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S LEGAL PRACTICE 1-25 (Mertz et al., eds., 2016); TAMANAHA, supra note 1; 
TAMANAHA, supra note 14; TWINING, supra note 5; Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New 
Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (2009); Victoria 
Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and Conditional Theory, 67 SMU L. REV. 101 
(2014); Tamanaha, supra note 6. 
28. See Part II at 5–6, supra. 
29. R. C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE 5–6 (2002). 
30. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Brazil and the Field of Socio-Legal Studies: Globalization, the 
Hegemony of the US, the Place of Law, and Elite Reproduction, 3 REVISTA DE ESTUDOS EMPÍRICOS 
EM DIREITO/BRAZILIAN JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 12 (2016). 
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to legal academics and lawyers.”31 D’Aspremont notes NLR’s promising synthesis 
of “self-reflective distance and the scepticism towards doctrinal dogmatism” while 
at the same time refusing to “back away from formal law-identification,” in the 
process perhaps taking some of the best aspects of both critical and doctrinal 
analyses: 
The awareness of the role of the social scientist as a human being 
and political being when carrying out empirical research is a lesson 
they overtly take from critical thinking.32 . . . New Legal Realism 
should be seen as one of the few contemporary attempts to bridge 
diverging strands of the international legal scholarship . . . .33 
For these reasons, D’Aspremont concludes that big-tent NLR is deserving of 
attention from international legal scholars.34 
NLR also covers a variety of research and approaches to international law and 
what can be termed legal globalization. The Leiden Journal of International Law in 
particular recently featured an article by Gregory Shaffer, entitled The New Legal 
Realist Approach to International Law,35 with a number of responses by other scholars. 
Shaffer emphasized the need to study international law empirically, to highlight 
especially “transnational legal orders,”36 and to combine different social science 
methods to provide pragmatic legal solutions to transnational problems.37 Shaffer 
and collaborators have also pioneered with a set of studies of the way that the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), as a transnational legal order, has interacted with 
national legal settings to transform legal contexts in Brazil, China, and India.38 
One of the responses, by Jakob Holtermann and Mikael Rask Madsen, offers 
a helpful variant of the Shaffer approach, drawing more on European rather than 
U.S. traditions of legal realism.39 The key difference, according to their analysis, is 
that the European approach is much less invested in the pragmatist project of aiding 
normative inquiry and legal reasoning—“doctrinal study of law as traditionally 
 
31. JEAN D’ASPREMONT, FORMALISM AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
THEORY OF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF LEGAL RULES 104 (2011). 
32. We would simply note that the “critical thinking” here can derive from multiple sources and 
for many NLR scholars, social science theory is a key source. 
33. D’ASPREMONT, supra note 31, at 105. 
34. Id. 
35. Gregory Shaffer, The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L  
L. 1–23 (2015). 
36. See TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015). 
37. See Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
229, 232, 237 (2012). 
38. Gregory Shaffer et al., State Transformation and the Role of Lawyers: The WTO, India, and 
Transnational Legal Ordering, 49 LAW & SOC. REV. 595 (2015); Gregory Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning 
at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 383 (2008); Gregory Shaffer & 
Henry Gao, From Paternalism to Partnership: The Development of International Trade Law Capacity 
in China (2015) (unpublished paper) (on file with Harvard GLEE Project). 
39. Jakob V. H. Holtermann & Mikael Rask Madsen, European New Legal Realism and International 
Law: How to Make International Law Intelligible, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 211, 212 (2015). 
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conceived.”40 The emphasis promoted from the European side, drawing especially 
on the sociological tradition of Pierre Bourdieu, is not normative in the sense that 
U.S. legal realism tends to be, as “the European legal realists strictly maintain that 
an empirically respectable legal science should remain external.”41 The research 
associated with Dezalay and Garth, beginning with Dealing in Virtue,42 is squarely 
within this European approach. From the latter perspective, the concern is less with 
reforming the law or improving the work of transnational legal orders and more 
with seeing the way that the “rules of the game” operate in a transnational  
field—as well as with explaining how law came to provide (1) the ordering, (2) the 
hierarchies and power relationships embedded in that ordering, and (3) the 
governing law itself, including competing imperial approaches.43 
One theme, which complements Shaffer’s work on the WTO, is that when 
“peripheral” outsiders to the European and U.S. “core” learn to gain more success 
within the WTO or international commercial arbitration, they also become more 
likely to look to arbitrators, law firms, and scholars from that core when the stakes 
are high—just as the outposts of the British empire sought London barristers for 
the most important cases in Hong Kong or Singapore.44 We note that to the extent 
scholars from outside the United States embrace the banner of NLR (or other 
scholarly approaches linked to the United States), we must be careful to avoid acting 
out and reproducing relationships of core and periphery. 
The general point, however, is that these two (and other) interdisciplinary 
approaches can be complementary even while differing in their starting points and 
approaches. Indeed, the seeming antinomy between those who want to get on with 
reform, typically from the law, and those who seem always to favor more research 
and deeper understanding, is one of the tensions that NLR sees not as an antinomy 
but as material for creative dialogue and translation. In this respect, NLR 
encompasses and permits the opportunity for direct discussion of a tension that 
pervades much of the social science community.45 
There are other ways to blend approaches that shed similar light on 
international law and legal phenomenon. In international criminal law, for example, 
John Hagan’s Justice in the Balkans,46 which examines the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), uses interviews and other methods in 
capturing the views of the interest groups, investigators, prosecutors, and witnesses 
 
40. Id. at 214. 
41. Holtermann & Madsen, supra note 39, at 220. 
42. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 




45. This echoes at a general level the tension between science and craft discussed by Hanoch 
Dagan as an important feature of New Legal Realism. Supra note 6, at 43-59. 
46. See generally JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN  
THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL (2003). 
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in order to show how humanitarian and international criminal law was constructed. 
A recent work on international commercial arbitration by Thomas Hale, while not 
explicitly a New Legal Realist, combines political science rational choice theory with 
detailed empirical research to examine the operation of contemporary international 
commercial arbitration.47 Hale documents how power operates and the role of elite 
legal networks. 
In addition to its receptiveness to scholarship from around the world, from 
multiple social science perspectives, and from a combination of doctrinal and law 
in action perspectives, another benefit of the New Legal Realist frame is that it 
invites a conversation between empirical research on law and legal theory or 
jurisprudence. This is a continued gift from the original Realists, whose work has 
received attention from legal academics who identify as scholars of jurisprudence: 
these legal theorists otherwise rarely concern themselves with knowledge of the law 
in action (or with any of the vibrant streams of research on law with realist roots). 
The article in this symposium by Brian Bix, discussed below, is a perfect example 
of this opportunity for more fruitful and better-informed conversation between 
legal philosophy and empirical research. This is also a continuation of the discussion 
begun at the first European conference on NLR, where scholars from these and 
other diverse approaches to the study of law were brought together to bridge 
divisions in a way that is rarely seen in the legal academy.48 
Also, since the initial U.S. New Legal Realism Conference, scholars involved 
in these efforts have worked together to form related networks. Under the aegis of 
the U.S. Law & Society Association, they developed a Collaborative Research 
Network on Realist and Empirical Methods, which has regularly sponsored panels 
on empirical research methods and on translations between law and social science.49 
At the Association of American Law Schools, researchers involved in both NLR 
and ELS have contributed to ongoing sessions designed to provide training and 
help in understanding empirical methods for law professors.50 A number of 
 
47. THOMAS HALE, BETWEEN INTERESTS AND LAW: THE POLITICS OF TRANSNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2015). 
48. See New Frontiers of Legal Realism: American, Scandinavian, European, Global,  
UNIV. COPENHAGEN, http://jura.ku.dk/ansatte/forskningsomraadet/?pure=da%2Factivities%2F 
new-frontiers-of-legal-realism-american-scandinavian-european-global(a2065411-a3a1-42be-86e7-
7882222ef776).html [https://perma.cc/KXN8-QC2P](last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
49. See What Is CRN 28?, NEW LEGAL REALISM, http://www.newlegalrealism.org/ 
events/CRN.html [https://perma.cc/3JKG-D4EB] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016). 
50. See Empirical Training Workshops, NEW LEGAL REALISM, http://www.newlegalrealism.org/ 
events/EmpiricalTrainingWorkshops.html [https://perma.cc/Y5NY-UV3K] (last visited Mar. 5, 
2016) (a pilot program in 2013 with NLR scholars leading the qualitative program and ELS scholar  
Ted Eisenberg leading the quantitative program); 2015: Third Annual Qualitative and Mixed-Methods 
Workshop at AALS, NEW LEGAL REALISM, http://www.newlegalrealism.org/events/AALS2015.html 
[https://perma.cc/7VDX-Z5N6] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (successive programs in 2014, with some 
variation in the degree to which methods were taught separately or as part of a combined “mixed 
methods” curriculum); 2014: Second Annual Qualitative AND Mixed-Methods Workshop at AALS, NEW 
LEGAL REALISM, http://www.newlegalrealism.org/events/AALS2014.html [https://perma.cc/ 
CLK4-TW7C] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (successive program in 2015); AALS Index, NEW LEGAL 
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conferences have explored the intersection of empirical work, law, and theory in 
particular domains—with examples ranging from poverty to women’s rights, and 
from global law to the impact of “indicators.”51 In August 2014, as we have noted, 
a group of NLR scholars met in Irvine, California to assess the trajectory of the past 
decade and explore new directions that an upcoming generation in NLR is poised 
to explore.52 
III. CURRENT REALIST DIRECTIONS: THE SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES 
It bears noting that of the four article contributions in this issue, two quite 
explicitly link the current work to the history of Legal Realism. In fact, Stewart 
Macaulay, who was one of the key individuals in what could be called Willard 
Hurst’s Wisconsin in the 1960s and 1970s, is very much a direct descendant of the 
original realist approach.53 Hurst came out of Legal Realism, built his own historical 
approach—making law the “dependent variable”—out of Realist approaches, and 
helped make Wisconsin a remarkable and unique interdisciplinary community that 
still continues to be strong in this approach.54 Riaz Tejani is a scholar from a 
different generation, but he also strongly anchors his current research in the 
concerns of the Realists. 
Stewart Macaulay’s article provides a superb statement of the openness of the 
NLR. He points out that it is necessary to build on the Realism of the 1930s to resist 
the pull of legal formalist attitudes, even if many acknowledge the limits of those 
formalist attitudes.55 He further emphasizes that communication and mutual respect 
between law and social science is an essential part of a constructive dialogue.56 The 
dialogue takes us to a level that has sometimes been difficult for law professors who 
may echo subconsciously or consciously the statement associated with Legal 
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53. Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling, From Legal Realism to Law and Society: Reshaping Law for the Last 
Stages of the Social Activist State, 32 LAW & SOC. REV. 409 (1998). 
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L. REV. 149 (2016). 
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Realists that lawyers should be “on top” and social scientists “on tap.”57 As 
Macaulay recognizes, mutual respect is not simply deploying “social science 
methods” to test law professors’ legal theories.58 Hiring a social scientist to say 
whether mediation is more efficient than arbitration, for example, would not be as 
effective as a joint project that took into account evolving social contexts and the 
many variables at play beyond the abstract categories of mediation and arbitration. 
Indeed, as Macaulay explains, sometimes citizens are regulated indirectly through 
public attitudes and understandings of law that have little to do with what lawyers 
understand to be relevant; thus, lawyers would need to listen to social scientists 
before framing a research question if they wanted to understand, for example, what 
might be keeping people from even trying to access legal rights at all.59 At the same 
time, he also warns that social scientists are at risk of misreading and 
misunderstanding the language of legal statutes and other technical aspects of law, 
if they are not sufficiently respectful of this very different approach.60 He concludes 
with a plea for careful interdisciplinary translations, and for a better dialogue 
between law and the social sciences.61 
Riaz Tejani draws on his anthropological and legal training to see what the 
deterrence notion from tort law means in our “one percent society.”62 He suggests 
there are huge social inequalities that an NLR approach should consider when 
developing legal and social scientific analyses. As part of this project, as noted 
above, he details how his approach links to the older Realist concern with actual 
behavior and with the perceptions that lead to behavioral responses. The huge costs 
of litigation bring their own form of deterrence, he argues. He makes sense of the 
phrase “lawyering up” and how, in today’s world, that brings the “specter of 
process” which may deter access to justice both on the plaintiff side and on the 
defense side (for ordinary businesses confronted with claims or liabilities).63 Tejani’s 
article actually performs the translation envisioned by NLR: he begins with the 
language and conceptual framework of tort doctrine, lays bare some of the hidden 
assumptions embedded in it, draws on Realist and empirical perspectives to 
demonstrate that those assumptions fail to capture law on the ground, and then 
proposes a way to take account of what is actually happening in legal process within 
the framework of formal law. To that end, he suggests that legal scholars and lawyers 
take account of “processual deterrence,” which considers the degree to which legal 
process actually deters people not only because of high costs and other difficulties, 
but also through the popular understandings of law (not always accurate) that deter 
 
57. Bryant G. Garth, James Willard Hurst as Entrepreneur for the Field of Law and Social Science, 18 
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L. REV. 207, 220 (2016). 
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people from even thinking about trying to access law.64 In this regard, Tejani is 
incorporating what we know from qualitative and interpretive studies of “legal 
consciousness” as well as what we know from qualitative and quantitative research 
on actual legal process.65 His article exemplifies the NLR idea that better 
understandings of how law works in practice can emerge from informed use of the 
available empirical research (viewed through the lens of social science norms) and 
informed translation of law (viewed through the lens of legal expertise in doctrine 
and law practice). 
Anna Offit also draws on anthropology in her fresh and insightful tour de 
force study of voir dire. She analyzes just how Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) 
use voir dire in cases going to jury trials. Her work, based on 121 semi-structured 
interviews and in-depth examinations of thirty-eight jury selections, tells us “how 
uncertainty informs technique.”66 Her theoretical approach comes from 
anthropology and provides a frame that allows her to analyze the ways AUSAs 
determine which jurors are the “outliers” or “crazies” whom the attorneys will 
challenge in a process analogized by respondents to “a blind date” or “job 
interview.”67 The different approaches to this daunting task are explained in Offit’s 
article, which includes an insightful description of some of the stereotypes used to 
disqualify potential jurors. She also further demonstrates how the professional 
identity shared by the AUSAs is expressed in their approach to voir dire. These 
federal prosecutors generally believe that they have such strong cases that only 
outliers and crazies need to be kept off the jury. The article concludes by making 
the case for in-depth qualitative empirical research as a key way to bridge gaps in 
understanding how the process of voir dire really works. Here, translation of 
relevant social science helps bridge the gap between theory and practice, 
demonstrating that even as attorneys use categories that verge on stereotypes in 
selecting jurors, these lawyers continue to redefine and negotiate those stereotypes 
in the face of the undeniable complexity of potential jurors as individual people “on 
the ground.”68 
The strength of Brian Bix’s article is that it is an example of someone trained 
in philosophy and law, and understandably not predisposed to take up empirical 
research, yet who draws systematically on both legal theories and empirical studies 
of “judging.”69 The article is open and respectful of empirical research and reads 
that research critically and insightfully. Bix dives into the empirical findings and 
hypotheses to offer issues and clarifications that can shape and help interpret new 
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debates and empirical research. For example, he suggests that we need tools to 
refine the prevailing “attitudinal” approach, which essentially focuses on ideology 
as the key to judicial decisions.70 That approach does not distinguish whether 
attitudes are brought to the judging explicitly or are brought by judges who think 
they are just following law. Bix also notes ongoing research that has demonstrated 
how judges often start deliberations with their own initial hunches, which may or 
may not then play formative roles in ultimate outcomes. Change happens during 
judges’ deliberations, and doctrinal reasoning can switch when something that is 
“beyond the pale” evolves a few years later into settled legal doctrine.71 Bix makes 
a strong case for the utility of nonempirical legal theorists in helping refine empirical 
studies by explaining perspectives from “inside” the legal culture; in this sense, he 
is arguing for careful attention to the interpretive norms and practices of judging—
particularly when it comes to how judges parse the legal texts through and in which 
they make their decisions.72 This approach is consistent with the spirit of NLR and 
indeed suggests the way that contemporary scholars in the philosophy of biology or 
the philosophy of physics dive into the empirical science rather than starting with 
grand philosophical themes. It also fits well with the way scholars of Science Studies 
focus on the actual practices of the scientists they study. 
Throughout these symposium articles, we find a fruitful elaboration of a New 
Legal Realist approach that brings together the best insights of law, empirical 
research, and disciplinary scholarship. These scholars take doctrine seriously but 
also move beyond the surface of law in books to investigate law in action—and then 
move back again to retranslate what they find into language that might speak to 
scholars in law as well as in social science. 
CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD 
The importance of NLR stems in part from the fact that lawyers have 
historically served as brokers between different sectors of society, such as the 
Church and the State, the Crown and the Aristocracy, the establishment and 
emerging social groups, and, more recently, different scholarly approaches and 
disciplines. NLR seeks to clarify that relationship, which is an academic project of 
considerable importance, and to make it more effective, which is in part a 
consequence of the academic project. Law professors who read some social science 
or attend a two-week course as preparation, conduct some empirical research, and 
then make legal and policy arguments may have their arguments quickly dismissed 
on the basis of methodological weaknesses, or may provide bad recipes for 
normative interventions in legal debates. Neither outcome is desirable. The quality 
and academic prestige of the social sciences is such that, today, the social scientists 
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need legal translators and the lawyer or legal scholar needs social science translators. 
NLR takes this process of mutual respect and translation as its raison d’etre. 
However successful that project, the very competitive academic field will 
remain characterized by (1) shifting hierarchies among disciplines—with sociology 
ascendant in the 1950s, for example, and economics ascendant in the 1980s; (2) true 
believers unwilling or unable to see the virtues of different academic approaches; 
and (3) academic entrepreneurs leading a charge for the one true path to mix social 
science and law. Yet it is vital to see beyond this quasi-religious strife to see what 
can emerge from ecumenical scholarship. Instead, we can hope that future 
discussions will follow the lead established by Mario Barnes in his Afterword, where 
he makes constructive suggestions as to how different, but closely related current 
scholarly endeavors might come together. His insightful commentary asks how 
NLR might learn from critically informed empirical research on race that is currently 
emerging from the burgeoning empirical Critical Race Theory (eCRT) scholarly 
movement.73 
The work that NLR has done over the past decade has helped to find a place 
for that big-tent scholarly approach. The examples from this symposium and other 
publications mentioned within this introduction demonstrate the richness of this 
approach and point the way for future work in the area. Rather than narrowing the 
scope of inquiry, NLR pushes previous limits, to allow ever more fruitful and skilled 
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